Hydrogen Explosion at BWXT’s Toronto plant.
During the March hearings held in Toronto and Peterborough, considerable attention was paid to the 29, 000, 000 litres of hydrogen gas stored at the Toronto site, with the expectation that at least an equivalent amount will be stored only a few metres from residential housing and a school in Peterborough.
One intervenor in Toronto asked about a 1999 event that forced the evacuation of residences surrounding the facility. Because residents had been evacuated from the area, there was local knowledge of the event, despite little reported in either GE-Hitachi’s filings or on the CNSC’s website. For this reason, the intervenor demanded to know why information was not publicly available.
After the March hearings, the CNSC quietly published a summary of what happened to be TWO events at the GE-Hitachi/BWXT facility.
BWXT claims that the change to a low pressure cryogenic storage vessel has remedied the problems with hydrogen, but cryogenic storage is unlikely to have prevented the second event - an explosion of hydrogen that injured a worker.
Hydrogen is an explosive gas. When it is contained - as it is inside the processing facility at BWXT- Toronto (and potentially Peterborough) - it has the ability to cause significant damage and disperse the uranium dioxide powder used at the facility.
Research indicates that other nuclear regulators around the world minimize the risk of hydrogen explosions by two means;
They don’t put their fuel manufacturing facilities across the street from schools. Most processing plants are located in rural areas or industrial parks. In recent years, no regulators have permitted the construction of any fuel manufacturing facilities anywhere near residential housing or schools. BWXT’s new Peterborough license next to a school is an international anomaly.
Internationally, nuclear fuel manufacturers utilize argon in combination with hydrogen. Argon is a Noble Gas that helps to prevent explosions.
There are three important takeaways from the events that occurred in 1999;
These events would have been kept quiet without community activism.
This facility was considered safe in 1998. It was safe until it wasn’t!
The change to cryogenic storage happened AFTER the events of 1999. This means that the CNSC certified a facility that was using an unsafe storage method. Moreover, GE-Hitachi was forced to update its safety procedures and equipment after the events of 1999. This “learning on the job” by the industry and regulator emphasizes why these facilities DO NOT BELONG in residential areas.